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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Tax Status of Municipally Owned
Transit System
RECENT EFFORTS of state and county officials to tax municipal
property which has heretofore been tax exempt' have brought into
sharp focus the decision in Zangerle v. Cleveland.' This case has
furnished authority for the gradual removal of exemptions formerly
granted. In attempting to predict the effect of this case on muni-
cipal property which is now tax immune, a reexamination of the
decision is helpful.
The Cleveland Transit System is a municipally owned public
utility furnishing Greater Cleveland with its primary means of
public transportation. It was acquired by the City of Cleveland
in 1942 when the assets of the privately owned Cleveland Railway
Company were purchased pursuant to Article 18, Section 4 of the
Ohio Constitution.? The necessary funds were derived from the
sale of mortgage revenue bonds. When the City became owner it
applied to the State Board of Tax Appeals to have the Transit
System property declared exempt from taxation on the ground
that it was "public property used for a public purpose" within
the purview of Ohio General Code Section 5351.' The Board
granted this request, but on appeal the decision was reversed by
the Ohio Supreme Court in the case of Zangerle v. Cleveland.
It was there held that the Cleveland Transit System was engaged
in a "private competitive business for profit" and thereby forfeited
its immunity from taxation under the "public purpose" clause of
Section 5351.
In concluding that the Transit System was organized for profit
the court emphasized that in its first three years of operation the
System had taken in sufficient revenue to pay off almost half the
purchase price. This seems the equivalent of saying that a public
'Shaker Heights v. Zangerle, 148 Ohio St. 361, 74 N.E. 2d 318 (1947)
(Municipally-operated rapid transit system held taxable); Case No. 15436,
State Board of Tax Appeals (April 4, 1949) (Cleveland Municipal Stadium
held taxable on the grounds that it is not used exclusively for a public purpose).
2145 Ohio St. 347, 61 N.E. 2d 720 (1945).
3
"Any municipality may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate within
or without its corporate limits, any public utility the products or service of
which is or is to be supplied to the municipality or its inhabitants .... "
4
"Real or personal property belonging exclusively to the State or United
States, and public property used for a public purpose, shall be exempt from
taxation." This statute was passed pursuant to Article 12, Section 2, of the
Ohio Constitution which authorized the General Assembly to pass laws
exempting from taxation such real property as was public property used
"exclusively for any public purpose."
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utility which is efficiently operated and self-sustaining loses its tax
immunity, while one which operates "in the red" is granted a
premium of tax exemption. The reasonableness of such an ap-
proach might well be questioned. One wonders whether the de-
cision would have been different if the suit had been brought two
years later when the System was operating at a loss. Furthermore,
the court's position on the profit question is in conflict with earlier
Ohio decisions' and the Cleveland City Charter.'
In Toledo v. Jenkins,' the authority upon which the Board of
Tax Appeals based its decision, the question presented was the
tax status of the Toledo Municipal Airport. This airport was pur-
chased by the City of Toledo from a private corporation. Some
of the hangars and other facilities were rented to private airlines.
Upon application for exemption of this property from taxation
the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a municipally owned and
operated airport constituted a public utility and would be con-
sidered public property within the meaning of Article 12, Section
2, of the Ohio Constitution and, therefore, within the scope of
Ohio General Code Section 5351. The court further stated that
all the real estate necessary and incidental to the operation of
such an airport and used therein is devoted to a public use, and
the fact that revenue is incidentally derived from public property
does not in and of itself alter the public character of its use. This
view is in accord with the general rule.' This decision was rendered
notwithstanding the fact that the facilities of the airport were used
to purchase tickets for transportation on privately owned airlines,
and that hangars were rented to the airlines for storage purposes.
Using the court's criterion of private competitive business, it ap-
pears that there would have been greater justification for taxing
the Toledo Municipal Airport than the Cleveland Transit System.
It is interesting to note that the Airport and the Transit System
decisions were made by the same court.9 Zangerle v. Cleveland
SToledo v. Jenkins, 143 Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E. 2d 656 (1944); Cleveland v.
Ruple, 130 Ohio St. 465, 200 N.E. 507 (1936).
6See note 10 infra.
7143 Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E. 2d 656 (1944).
8,... where the primary and principal use to which the property is put is
public, the mere fact that an income is incidentally derived from it does not
affect its character as property devoted to a public use." 3 A.L.R. 1439,
1445 (1919).
9The same members comprised the court in both cases; however, Judges
Zimmerman and Williams were the only two who felt that the Toledo Airport
case should be controlling in the decision in the principal case, and dissented
on that basis.
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was distinguished on the ground that "the primary and principal
object of the enterprise is profit," whereas the revenue in the case
of the Toledo Airport was termed "incidental".
It is difficult to see how the Transit System could be termed
an organization for profit when there are no stockholders to whom
any profit could be distributed, nor any provision in the Cleveland
City Charter for the transfer of an operating surplus from the
treasury of the Transit System to the general fund of the city.
One would naturally suppose that any operating surplus would
be reflected in improved service or lower fares, or be held to
cover future deficits. Furthermore, the Charter inferentially pro-
vides for operation at cost."0
In stating that the Transit System was engaged in a "private
competitive business", the court apparently disregarded the case
of Cleveland v. Ruple."1 There the question presented was whether
a municipal underground hall constructed for holding public ex-
hibitions and for other public purposes could be operated as a pri-
vate garage. The court held that it could not, saying: "... neither
the Constitution nor the statutes contain language which can be
construed as an attempt to confer upon a municipality the privilege
of engaging in a purely private competitive business." And further:
"No attempt . . . has been made to confer power upon public
corporations in this state to enter into private competitive busi-
ness.""A close observance of the above would necessitate a finding
that if the Transit System is engaged in a private competitive busi-
ness it is thereby carrying on an unauthorized function. There
has been no such finding. Casting further doubt upon the accuracy
of the description of the Transit System as a "private competitive
business" is the fact that it operates as a virtual monopoly in the
public transportation field within the city.
Another factor upon which the court relied in reaching its
decision in the principal case was that the operation of the Cleve-
land Transit System was a "proprietary" as distinguished from
a "governmental" function, and as such would not come within
the "public purpose" provision of Section 5351. A proprietary
function is one which relates to the development of a municipality
and is primarily for the comfort and convenience of its citizens, 3
10"The rates of fare shall be such as will wholly reimburse the Board for the
costs of operation.... ." § 113-5.
11130 Ohio St. 465, 200 N.E. 507 (1936).
121d. at 470, 200 N.E. at 510 (1936).




in contrast to a governmental functon which is designed to protect
health and safety. A municipally owned property which has been
held to be for a proprietary purpose includes the operation and
maintenance of a municipal light plant, 4 a railroad, 5 a bus line,1"
a waterworks supplying water to its inhabitants," and the operation
and maintenance of an airport.' The court's conclusion that the
Cleveland Transit System is engaged in a proprietary function is,
therefore, sound.'9 The fallacy in the court's position lies in its
basic assumption that the employment of public property in a
proprietary function precludes its use for a "public purpose" and,
therefore, its exemption from taxation. A reference to prior de-
cisions would have disclosed the unsoundness of this conclusion
as the Ohio Supreme Court has held exempt from taxation by
virtue of their use exclusively for a public purpose, municipally
owned and operated airports,2" and equipment and fixtures of a
plant used to supply natural gas to its citizens.2' No distinction
is apparent between the Transit System and the aforementioned
tax-exempt public utilities. To exempt it would be in accord with
the majority rule,22 which holds that where a statute exempts
from taxation municipal property used for public purposes, muni-
cipally owned power and light plants,22 waterworks,24 gasworks,2"
and transit systems 6 are included within the meaning of the
statute.
14Travelers Ins. Co. v. Village of Wadsworth, 109 Ohio St. 440, 142 N.E.
900 (1924); Butler v. Karb, 96 Ohio St. 472, 117 N.E. 953 (1917).
15State ex rel. Forchheimer v. Le Blond, 108 Ohio St. 41, 140 N.E. 491 (1923).
16Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Village of North Olmstead, 130 Ohio St. 144, 198
N.E. 41 (1935).
17Winona v. Botzet, 169 Fed. 321 (C.C.A. 8th 1909); Lynch v. Springfield,
174 Mass. 430, 54 N.E. 871 (1899); Wiltse v. City of Red Wing, 99 Minn. 255,
109 N.W. 114 (1906); City of Barberton v. Miksch, 128 Ohio St. 169, 190 N.E.
387 (1934); Stiles v. Village of Newport, 76 Vt. 154, 56 At. 662 (1904).
'
8Toledo v. Jenkins, 143 Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E. 2d 656 (1944).
1928 Omo JuR., Municipal Corporations § 63.
20See note 18 supra.
21Toledo v. Hosler, 54 Ohio St. 418, 43 N.E. 583 (1896); Toledo v. Yeager,
8 Ohio Cir. Ct. 318 (1894).
2251 AMf. JuR., Taxation § 563.
23Logansport v. Public Serv. Comm., 202 Ind. 523, 177 N.E. 249 (1931).
241bid; Johnson City v. Weeks, 133 Tenn. 277, 180 S.W. 327 (1915).
25Commonwealth v. Richmond, 116 Va. 69, 81 S.E. 69 (1914).
26Collector of Taxes v. Boston, 278 Mass. 274, 180 N.E. 116 (1932); Sun
Printing v. Mayor, 152 N.Y. 257, 46 N.E. 499 (1897). Note, 9 U. Detroit
L.J. 46 (1945).
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As a further basis for its decision in the principal case the
court adopts the view that municipal ownership and operation of
the Cleveland Transit System was not within the contemplation
of the framers of the Constitution of Ohio in 1851. Therefore,
reasons the court, as it has not since been specifically included,
it should be considered excluded, as a constitution should be in-
terpreted in the light of conditions which obtained at the time
of its adoption. This is a very narrow view. The writer feels that
the generally prevailing and more liberal manner of constitutional
construction should be adopted, namely that a constitution is in-
tended to meet and be applied to newly arising conditions and
circumstances which come fairly within the purview of the language
used."
In characterizing the Transit System as a private competitive
business for profit the court seems to have assumed the point in
issue without a clear analysis of the problem. It either disregarded
or ineffectively distinguished earlier Supreme Court decisions
exempting municipally operated public utilities from taxation.2"
In so doing it destroyed the landmarks of the past without furnish-
ing new guides in their place. City officials are now understandably
uncertain as to the tax status of much municipal property used for
proprietary purposes. Recent decisions following Zangerle v. Cleve-
land have measurably increased their concern in this matter.2"
It is believed that the Court was motivated primarily by con-
cern over the growing encroachment by municipalities upon fields
of traditional private endeavor and anxiety over loss of needed tax
revenue resulting from a removal from the tax duplicate of sub-
stantial property once listed. Fundamental changes based on such
considerations are more properly the concern of the legislature than
the judiciary. To restore certainty to this field it is now necessary
for the legislature to redefine the nature of the exemption accorded
to municipal corporations engaged in public functions.
SHELDON E. ROSENBLUM
27Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1926); Gaiser
v. Buck, 203 Ind. 9, 179 N.E. 1 (1931; Carter v. Craig, 27 N.H. 200, 90 Ad. 598
(1914); State ex rel. Columbus v. Ketterer, 127 Ohio St. 483, 189 N.E. 252(1934); Payne v. Racine, 217 Wis. 550, 259 N.W. 437 (1935); 8 OMo JuR.,
Constitutional Law § 26; 11 AM. JuR., Constitutional Law § 51.
28Toledo v. Jenkins, 143 Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E. 2d 656 (1944); Toledo v.
Hosler, 54 Ohio St. 418, 43 N.E. 583 (1896); Toledo v. Yeager, 8 Ohio Cir.
Ct. 318 (1894).
29Cases cited note 1 supra.
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